Cambodia's Involvement
The United States and Prince Sihanouk, the Cambodian chief of State, worked together in the growth of a Cambodian military, together they meant to make Cambodia an independent state free of Communism. A U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group for Cambodia was recognized and funded with over $85 million to help in the training of the Cambodian Army. There wasn’t an original component in Cambodia trying to start a Communist government but North Vietnam threatened the border regions and used them in the Ho Chi Ming Trail complex.
In 1958, Cambodia opened diplomatic channels to Communist China, growing doubts about the country's dependability as a U.S. ally. By 1960 the NVA were making obvious use of Cambodian land for logistical provision of their processes in South Vietnam. Although Sihanouk sustained to accept U.S. aid, he dreaded Cambodian involvement in Vietnam and didn’t use his Army to delay with the NVA action even when it was openly known. When U.S. or S. Vietnamese troops chased NVA/VC through the Cambodian border, such intrusions were complained as defilements of the 1954 Geneva Accords. By 1965, Sihanouk was convinced the CIA was stimulating plots to overthrow him. He detached relatives with the U.S., all consultants were evicted, and Cambodia began accepting aid from Communist countries.
Sihanouk rapidly had causes to remorse closer ties to the Communists. In 1967 a Communist-backed peasant revolt made a Communist insurgency called the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. These progresses were purpose enough for the U.S. to dispatch Special Forces teams into Cambodia on "Daniel Boone" assignments to realize and display NVA/VC base areas along the border. By late 1968 the North Vietnamese were moving most of their supplies by a network of truck, pipeline, and river barge facilities that ended at depots within and contiguous to South Vietnam. As the U.S. policy of Vietnamization took hold, the Communist militaries had fewer backing within South Vietnam and came to depend on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and cross-border sanctuaries. The neutralization of the Cambodian bases became a more crucial subject since they were the key to the NVA/VC power that the S. Vietnamese would be fighting alone. The bulk of the Communist installations were located in the "fishhook" and "parrot’s beak" salients, the latter only about 35 miles from Saigon. From the relative safety of these sanctuaries, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were able to mount periodic forays across the border into the III Corps area of South Vietnam.
In 1958, Cambodia opened diplomatic channels to Communist China, growing doubts about the country's dependability as a U.S. ally. By 1960 the NVA were making obvious use of Cambodian land for logistical provision of their processes in South Vietnam. Although Sihanouk sustained to accept U.S. aid, he dreaded Cambodian involvement in Vietnam and didn’t use his Army to delay with the NVA action even when it was openly known. When U.S. or S. Vietnamese troops chased NVA/VC through the Cambodian border, such intrusions were complained as defilements of the 1954 Geneva Accords. By 1965, Sihanouk was convinced the CIA was stimulating plots to overthrow him. He detached relatives with the U.S., all consultants were evicted, and Cambodia began accepting aid from Communist countries.
Sihanouk rapidly had causes to remorse closer ties to the Communists. In 1967 a Communist-backed peasant revolt made a Communist insurgency called the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot. These progresses were purpose enough for the U.S. to dispatch Special Forces teams into Cambodia on "Daniel Boone" assignments to realize and display NVA/VC base areas along the border. By late 1968 the North Vietnamese were moving most of their supplies by a network of truck, pipeline, and river barge facilities that ended at depots within and contiguous to South Vietnam. As the U.S. policy of Vietnamization took hold, the Communist militaries had fewer backing within South Vietnam and came to depend on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and cross-border sanctuaries. The neutralization of the Cambodian bases became a more crucial subject since they were the key to the NVA/VC power that the S. Vietnamese would be fighting alone. The bulk of the Communist installations were located in the "fishhook" and "parrot’s beak" salients, the latter only about 35 miles from Saigon. From the relative safety of these sanctuaries, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were able to mount periodic forays across the border into the III Corps area of South Vietnam.
By: Sam B